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Whose Myth? Which ation?  





Flying hawk, grey bird, 
out of the holy place, out of Jerusalem, 
holding a swallow, holding a bird, 
That is no hawk, grey bird, 
that is Elijah, holy one; 
holding no swallow, no bird 
but writing from the Mother of God 
to the Emperor at Kosovo. 
He drops that writing on his knee, 
it is speaking to the Emperor: 
‘Lazar, glorious Emperor,  
which is the empire of your choice? 
Is it the empire of heaven? 
Is it the empire of the earth? 
If it is the empire of the earth, 
saddle horses and tighten girth-straps, 
and fighting-men, buckle on swords, 
attack the Turks, 
and all the Turkish army shall die. 
But if the empire of heaven 
weave a church on Kosovo, 
build its foundation not with marble stones, 
build it with pure silk and with crimson cloth, 
take the Sacrament, marshal the men, 
they shall all die, 
and you shall die among them as they die.’ 
And when the Emperor heard those words, 
he considered, he considered and thought, 
‘Kind God, what shall I do, how shall I do it? 
What is the empire of my choice? 
Is it the empire of heaven? 
Is it the empire of the earth? 
And if I shall choose the empire of the earth,  
the empire of the earth is brief, 
heaven is everlasting.’ 
And the Emperor chose the empire of heaven 
above the empire of the earth. 
 
‘The Downfall of the Serbian Empire’, Serbian epic song1 
 
As he was being escorted to a military helicopter on 28 June 2001, about to be 
extradited to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at The 
Hague, Slobodan Milošević, the former Serbian and Yugoslav president, allegedly 
asked his guards: ‘Do you know it’s St Vitus’ Day today?’2 St Vitus’ Day, or 
Vidovdan is the anniversary of the medieval Battle of Kosovo. On 28 June (15 June 
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O.S.) 1389, Christian armies under the command of Prince Lazar of Serbia clashed 
with Ottoman troops led by Sultan Murad I; both sides suffered heavy casualties, 
including the two leaders.3 The cult of the Holy Martyr Lazar provides a key element 
of the Serbian4 Kosovo myth, which is in turn central to the Serbian national ideology.  
The significance of 28 June in the Serbian and Yugoslav ‘national calendar’ is further 
reinforced by the fact that it is also the anniversary of several other key events: the 
assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914; the promulgation of the first 
(and controversial) Constitution of Yugoslavia in 1921; the expulsion of Yugoslavia 
from the Cominform in 1948; and the date that symbolises the rise (in 1989) and fall 
(in 2001) of Milošević. Indeed, it is possible that no other national history is so 
strongly connected with a single date.5  
Milošević was of course well aware of the mobilising power of the myth when 
on 28 June 1989 he triumphantly flew to Kosovo, in another helicopter, in order to 
address a crowd of around one million mostly Serbs and Montenegrins from all parts 
of Yugoslavia and from abroad who gathered to celebrate the 600th anniversary of the 
battle. Because Milošević had just assumed the presidency of the Socialist Republic 
of Serbia (part of the then Yugoslav federation) the previous month the whole event 
seemed like a coronation of a new Serbian ‘Emperor’.6 In an atmosphere of high 
tensions between Serbs and ethnic Albanians and across former Yugoslavia, when it 
was becoming increasingly difficult to separate myth from reality, Milošević probably 
appeared to some Serbs as a resurrected Lazar (Lazarus).7 Indeed, large pictures of 
Lazar and Milošević predominated among pictures of historical figures and nationalist 
slogans carried by many of those who attended the commemoration of the 600th 
anniversary of the battle.8 
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As a prelude to the anniversary, Prince Lazar’s remains ‘toured’ Serbian 
monasteries across Yugoslavia, with Serbs coming to pay homage in their thousands.9 
Although Milošević’s 1989 Kosovo speech does not sound overtly nationalist, 
especially when placed in the context of the discourse(s) which accompanied the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, it nevertheless contains the following lines:  
The Kosovo heroism does not allow us to forget that, at one time, we were 
brave and dignified and one of the few who went into battle undefeated…Six 
centuries later, again we are in battles and quarrels. They are not armed 
battles, though such things should not be excluded yet.10 
 
The role of Kosovo, both symbolic and real, in the rise and fall of Slobodan Milošević 
is well documented,11 while the battle, its legacy and the myth have been subjects of a 
number of studies.12 It was thanks to a visit to Kosovo in April 1987, at the time when 
Kosovo’s Serb minority protested against alleged discrimination by the province’s 
Albanian majority, that Milošević first became widely perceived as a protector of 
Serbian rights, although initially more by a set of circumstances than his own design. 
However, he made the most out of the 600th anniversary of the battle two years later, 
cementing his position as the undisputed Serb leader. The war against NATO and 
ethnic Albanians over the status of Kosovo in 1999 would mark the beginning of 
Milošević’s fall. Ironically, it was during the Kosovo war that Milošević was indicted 
by the Hague Tribunal. He lost presidential elections in September 2000 and was 
forced by a popular revolt to resign the following month. In March 2001 the former 
president was arrested by Serbia’s authorities before eventually being transferred to 
The Hague on 28 June. He died in his prison cell of a heart attack in March 2006, 
before the trial could be completed.    
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During the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s some authors sought to explain the 
Serbian-instigated violence by a nationalist mythology at the centre of which lies the 
myth of Kosovo.13 According to this argument, the genocide committed by Serbian 
forces was not caused by ‘the pathology of the individual organizing and committing 
the genocide, but the pathology of the ideas guiding them’.14 In this article, I argue 
that history of the Kosovo myth does not offer a straightforward narrative that links 
the Serbia of 1389 with events of the last two decades in former Yugoslavia. Myths, 
like nations, have their own history – history that is seldom linear and predetermined 
– and are an essential ingredient of nation-building.15 Just as it may be argued that the 
process of nation-building is never fully completed, so national myths evolve and gain 
new interpretations over time. As another scholar of the Serbian Kosovo myth has 
argued, ‘[i]t would be quite misleading to assume that the Kosovo myth has remained 
unchanged in the course of the past centuries’ – to assume this ‘would be to fall prey 
to the anti-historical pretensions of the nationalist myth-mongers, who assert that 
myth, historical events and subsequent interpretations are congruent.’16   
The Serbian Kosovo myth does not differ fundamentally from other national 
myths.17 National myths are usually linked to key historical events which are 
perceived as turning points in the collective destiny of the nation. Therefore, they are 
not wholly invented or imagined, but, as a historian of East Slavonic national myths 
has suggested, ‘must also resonate in a plausible past and find an appropriate place in 
the mainstream of popular memory in order to take root’.18 But, how important is it to 
distinguish between the fictional and factual in order to understand the significance of 
a myth? It may be argued that understanding the interplay between the ‘truth’ and the 
‘myth’ of Kosovo would be more productive than emphasising differences between 
the history and the myth.19 Dismantling the Kosovo myth and separating the historical 
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from the mythical proved significant for the birth of the critical historiography in 
Serbia in the nineteenth century (as is suggested below). However, for a historian 
today to engage in proving that the legend of Kosovo is not based on historical truth 
would be an unnecessary exercise, not least because the history and the myth of 
Kosovo are inseparable in Serbian popular culture and imagination.20  
Because I am particularly interested in the myth of Kosovo as a national myth, 
the analysis concentrates on the last two centuries, during which modern nationalist 
ideologies emerged and developed. In particular, I address the following three issues: 
a) the significance of the Kosovo myth during the emergence of modern Serbian 
national ideology in the nineteenth century; b) the Kosovo myth as a pan-Yugoslav 
myth; and c) the use of the Kosovo myth by the West. First, however, it is necessary 
to explain briefly the background to and the origins of the myth.  
 
Background and origins 
 
In the Middle Ages Kosovo referred to a geographic plain, much smaller than the 
territory of present-day Kosovo. Kos in Serbian means ‘black bird’, and Kosovo 
Polje, the site of the battlefield, means ‘the field of black birds’. German chronicles 
refer to the battlefield as Amselfeld, and sources in Latin as campus merulae. The 
territory to the west of Kosovo was known in the Middle Ages as ‘Metohija’ (after the 
Greek word metohi, meaning ‘dependence of a monastery) because large portions of 
land were owned by Serbian monasteries and the Mt Athos. Present-day Kosovo was 
not a single administrative unit in medieval Serbia, but was divided between the 
districts of Lab and Sitnica. It should not be confused with the Ottoman vilayet 
(province) of Kosovo which included in addition to what today is Kosovo, parts of 
present-day Macedonia, south-western Serbia, as well as parts of Montenegro. In fact, 
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borders of present-day Kosovo were not drawn until 1946, when it was established as 
Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohija within the People’s Republic of Serbia, 
one of the six republics of the Communist-led Yugoslav federation. ‘Metohija’ was 
dropped from the name of the province in 1968 by the Yugoslav authorities, before it 
was officially reintroduced by the Serbian government in 1989. Serbs prefer to call 
the province by its full name – Kosovo and Metohija (sometimes Kosmet for short), 
while ethnic Albanians never use the word Metohija, possibly because of its Serbian 
Orthodox connotations. The Albanian spelling for the province is Kosovë, 
pronounced, and sometimes spelled, as Kosova. The spelling ‘Kossovo’ may also be 
found in older English-language texts.21 
The Kosovo myth emerged not long after the fourteenth century battle 
between the predominantly Serbian Christian forces (Bosnians, Bulgarians, Albanians 
and Vlachs as well as some Hungarians are believed to have joined the Serbian army) 
led by Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović of Serbia and Ottoman Turkish forces, which also 
included Serbian, Albanian and other Christian vassals and mercenaries, led by Sultan 
Murad I.22 Not much is known about the battle except that it took place near Priština, 
at Kosovo Polje (the Field of Blackbirds) on 28 (15 O.S.) June 1389. Even the 
outcome was inconclusive, although it is known that both sides suffered heavy 
casualties, and that both the Serbian Prince and the Ottoman Sultan were killed. In the 
Serbian ‘collective memory’23 the battle is remembered as a fateful defeat which led 
to the loss of independence and the ‘five century-long Turkish yoke’.24 In reality only 
some parts of southern Serbia were under Ottoman control for five centuries. The last 
independent Serbian city, Smederevo, fell to the Ottoman armies in 1459. Serbia re-
emerged as an autonomous principality in 1829, before becoming de facto 
independent from the Ottoman Empire at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, exactly 419 
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years after the fall of Smederevo. As part of the same mythical discourse, Prince 
Lazar is erroneously referred to as ‘Emperor’ (Tsar), despite being only one of several 
nobles who took over various regions of medieval Serbia following the death of the 
last Emperor, Stefan Uroš V, in 1371.25  
First reports after the battle claimed the Christian victory, but the outcome was 
most probably a draw. Nevertheless, if the Ottomans did not necessarily win in 1389, 
it may be argued that in the long-term the battle could be seen as a Serbian defeat. 
Serbia never fully recovered despite surviving for another seventy years before finally 
capitulating to the Ottoman Turks in 1459. Post-Kosovo Serbia even prospered, 
buoyed by the flood of refugees from the Byzantine, Bulgarian and southern Serbian 
territories taken by the Ottomans. The survival, let alone relative prosperity and 
stability of the Serbian state for another seventy years after the Kosovo battle is often 
overlooked, even though it was no small achievement and seventy years is by no 
means a short ‘life-span’ for a state in East-Central Europe. Former Yugoslavia, for 
example, existed for seventy years (between 1918 and 1941 and between 1945 and 
1992).  
Central to the Kosovo myth is the cult of the Holy Martyr Lazar. According to 
legend, on the eve of the battle the Holy Prophet Elijah offered Prince Lazar a choice 
between an empire in heaven and an empire on earth. Lazar’s choice – a heavenly 
empire – would mean defeat by the Ottomans but it would secure a kingdom in 
heaven for the Serbian nation. The sacrifice that Lazar and his knights made at 
Kosovo turned a military defeat into a moral victory. That Kosovo was a place where 
Serbian medieval rulers built some of the most important churches and monasteries, 
and where the Serbian Patriarchate, established in 1346, was based, further 
contributed to the special place the region and the medieval battle occupy in Serbian 
 8
collective psyche. (In fact, the Patriarchate was based in the town of Peć in Metohija). 
Kosovo is frequently described by Serbs – and sometimes by non-Serbs26 – as the 
‘Serbian Jerusalem’, while the Serbs are often compared to the Israelites. The analogy 
with Jerusalem is above all meant to emphasise that Kosovo is the cradle of the 
Serbian civilisation. However, it has also served to send another message, namely that 
Serbs share the Jews’ destiny as a  nation forced out of its original homeland, now 
‘occupied’ by a hostile Muslim population.27 During the rise of Serbian nationalism in 
the 1980s – which preceded the rise of Milošević and was a phenomenon that initially 
at least developed independently of him – Serbian intellectuals often made parallels 
between the fate of Jews and Serbs. In the mid-1980s the Serbian writer (and later 
politician) Vuk Drašković even claimed that ‘Serbs are the thirteenth, lost and the 
most ill-fated tribe of Israel’.28 Drašković’s metamorphosis from a nationalist writer 
to a nationalist leader of the opposition to Milošević before becoming a moderate 
Foreign Minister of Serbia and Montenegro following the fall of Milošević may have 
been remarkable, but his fascination with the apparent similarities between Jews and 
Serbs apparently has remained. In October 2004 he asked in Belgrade a visiting 
delegation of the World Jewish Congress to support Serbia’s position on Kosovo, 
adding that should this predominantly Albanian-populated province become 
independent ‘[a]ll Serbians will leave Kosovo and we will take the position of 
European Jews starting to dream about...our spiritual home.’29 Members of other 
Yugoslav nations – Croats, Slovenes, but in particular, paradoxically perhaps, the 
Bosnian Muslims and predominantly Muslim Albanians of Kosovo – have also made 
analogies with the Jews in order to strengthen their claims to victimhood. In this they 
were often backed by their supporters abroad, including intellectuals of Jewish 
background. NATO leaders often compared events in Kosovo during the bombing 
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campaign against Serbia in 1999 to the Holocaust, no doubt in order to secure public 
backing for the military intervention.30 
The cult of Prince Lazar has a strong biblical undertone, no doubt because the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, which acknowledged Lazar as a saint soon after the battle, 
played a central role in the emergence and the preservation of the Kosovo myth. The 
myth makes a direct analogy between Lazar and Jesus Christ; like Jesus, Lazar died 
so that his people could live. According to the legend, the night before the battle 
Lazar hosted a last supper during which he told his knights that one of them would 
betray him the following day. A young knight named Miloš Obilić, suspected by 
Lazar of being the traitor, killed the Ottoman Sultan during the battle, determined to 
prove his loyalty to the Prince. The Judas-like figure is to be found in the person of 
Vuk Branković, the lord of Kosovo, who survived the battle. Historians cannot 
establish the identity of the Sultan’s assassin; it seems very unlikely that Branković 
(or anyone else for that matter) was a traitor. However, as myths generally tend to 
appeal to a wider public significantly more than complex, scholarly interpretations, 
the legends of Lazar’s sacrifice, Miloš Obilić’s heroism and Vuk Branković’s 
treachery still survive as an integral part of Serbian collective discourse. Indeed, many 
Serbs today understand their history as a series of tragic defeats due to the lack of 
national unity and acts of treason, but also they often believe their defeats represent 
moral victories. 
 In addition to these male characters, there are three key female figures among 
the dramatis personae of the Kosovo mythology: ‘Empress’ Milica, the Mother of the 
Jugovići, and the Kosovo Maiden. Princess Milica, usually referred to in the popular 
tradition as ‘Carica’ (or ‘Tsaritsa’, i.e. ‘Empress’), was Lazar’s wife.31 In the epic 
song ‘Tsar Lazar and Tsaritsa Militsa’, Milica successfully pleads with Lazar to allow 
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her youngest brother Boško Jugović to stay behind, so that at least one of her nine 
brothers survives the battle. Milica is heartbroken when Boško refuses to not go to 
Kosovo, and when her other brothers and her father Jug Bogdan all reject her plea. 
The epic song ‘The Mother of the Jugovići’ translates the national disaster into a 
tragedy of a mother who dies of a broken heart when two ravens bring her the arm of 
her youngest son Boško. The third chief female character is a young anonymous girl 
referred to as the Kosovo Maiden. In ‘The Kosovo Maiden’ the girl comes to Kosovo 
Polje the morning after the battle to nurse the wounded Serbian soldiers. Surrounded 
by countless dead bodies, the Kosovo Maiden, like ‘Tsaritsa’ Milica, symbolises a 
sense of an enormous loss and isolation in which many Serbs, but particularly Serbian 
women, found themselves during and after the Ottoman conquest.32 Unlike Milica, the 
Mother of the Jugovići and the Kosovo Maiden were not historical figures.33 
Interestingly, the songs about the latter two as well as perhaps the main song on the 
Kosovo theme, ‘The Downfall of the Serbian Empire’, were noted down from female 
singers by Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, the nineteenth-century Serbian language 
reformer and oral historian.34 
 
The Kosovo myth and the emergence of modern Serbian nationalism  
 
Although the memory of the Battle of Kosovo was preserved in the rich epic poetry 
and in church chronicles and sermons throughout the Ottoman period, the myth only 
assumed today’s significance in the nineteenth century, when modern Serbian 
nationalism emerged. Like other European nationalisms, the Serbian one looked back 
to the glorious past, or ‘golden age’, seeking to recreate the independence for the 
nation it had once enjoyed; like other nationalisms, it needed a ‘usable past’.35 The 
Kosovo myth offered several ‘convenient’ themes. 
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First, defeat at the battlefield may have led to the loss of medieval statehood, 
but it had been turned into a moral victory which promised the state’s resurrection. In 
that respect, the emphasis of defeat is central to the Kosovo myth, regardless of the 
actual outcome of the battle. As Thomas Emmert argues,  
[To Serbs] the theme of defeat at Kosovo was necessary for the companion 
themes of hope and resurrection. Lazar and Serbian people gave their lives 
freely for the faith and for the land; and because of this martyrdom at the 
hands of the heathen enemy the Serbs knew that God would protect His people 
and return them one day from their captivity…any impression of a Serbian 
victory and even an indecisive outcome was lost in the emerging legendary 
tradition of Kosovo.36  
 
Second, the explanation of defeat due to treachery at Kosovo offered a convenient if 
not necessarily historical interpretation of the decline of medieval Serbia. The Serbian 
Empire had already begun to disintegrate before the battle took place, chiefly due to 
the internal struggle for succession, following Emperor Stefan Dušan’s death.37 
Finally, the Kosovo myth fitted into another, more universal myth of antemurale 
christianitatis, common to several other east-central European peoples. Although this 
myth is usually associated with Roman Catholic nations such as the Croats, 
Hungarians, and Poles, the Serbs’ self-perception as bulwark of Christianity should 
not be overlooked. As Milošević declared at Kosovo Polje on 28 June 1989:  
Six centuries ago, Serbia heroically defended itself in the field of Kosovo, but 
it also defended Europe. Serbia was at that time the bastion that defended the 
European culture, religion, and European society in general. Therefore today it 
appears not only unjust but even unhistorical and completely absurd to talk 
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about Serbia's belonging to Europe. Serbia has been a part of Europe 
incessantly, now just as much as it was in the past, of course, in its own way, 
but in a way that in the historical sense never deprived it of dignity.38 
 
References to the medieval past, including the Battle of Kosovo, were frequent in 
Serbia during the anti-Ottoman uprisings of the early nineteenth century. Once the 
First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813) turned into a struggle for independence from the 
Ottoman Empire (as opposed to the rebellion against local Ottoman officials it had 
been initially), the Serbian revolutionaries believed they were fighting for the 
restoration of the medieval statehood lost at Kosovo. A rallying call by Karadjordje 
Petrović, the leader of the First Uprising, illustrates this well: ‘[Let us] throw off, in 
the name of God, the yoke which the Serbs carry from Kosovo to this day.’39 
If the cult of Prince Lazar was central to the early history of the myth, the cult 
of Miloš Obilić, the knight who allegedly killed the Sultan, became just as important 
to the Kosovo mythology in the nineteenth century. The legendary heroism of Miloš 
Obilić had a particular appeal in Montenegro, where the Kosovo tradition was in the 
past perhaps even stronger than in Serbia. As a nineteenth-century Serbian traveller to 
Montenegro observed: ‘when you talk to these people [Montenegrins] you have the 
impression that the Battle of Kosovo took place yesterday.’40 Similarly, Milovan 
Djilas, the late Yugoslav dissident and writer, wrote in a historical study of 
nineteenth-century Montenegro that ‘Obilić and Kosovo were not something that 
happened some time ago and far away, but they were here – in daily thoughts and 
feelings and life and struggle with the Turks.’41 Even today some Montenegrins 
believe that they are the direct descendants of Serbian knights who survived the 
battle.42 Prince-Bishop of Montenegro Petar II Petrović Njegoš (1830-1851) was one 
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of the advocates of this understanding of Montenegro’s origins. In order to strengthen 
further the symbolic presence of the myth in everyday life in Montenegro he altered 
the traditional Montenegrin cap, to emphasise more directly the links with medieval 
Serbia.43  
Njegoš is best remembered as the author of The Mountain Wreath – a long 
poem first published in 1847, about a fictional struggle to extermination against Slav 
Muslim converts, which makes frequent references to Kosovo and especially to Miloš 
Obilić, and is dedicated to Karadjordje Petrović.44 The Prince-Bishop is widely 
considered the greatest poet Montenegro and the Serbs have ever had and many Serbs 
and Montenegrins know The Mountain Wreath by heart.45 Among them was Gavrilo 
Princip, who clearly identified with Miloš Obilić while firing revolver shots at the 
unfortunate Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie in Sarajevo on 28 June 
1914.46 Indeed, his fellow revolutionaries regarded him as a modern-day Miloš. One 
of them wrote after the war to Luigi Albertini, historian of the First World War: ‘The 
Serbs carry on a hero cult, and today with the name of Milo Obilić they bracket that of 
Gavrilo Princip; the former stands for Serbian heroism in the tragedy of the Kosovo 
Field, the latter for Serbian heroism in the final liberation.’47  
One of Njegoš’s successors, Prince (later King) Nikola of Montenegro, who 
had hoped that Montenegro (rather than Serbia) would emerge as the ‘Piedmont of 
Serbdom’, also wrote a well-known poem ‘There, over there’, which lamented the 
loss at Kosovo.48 Both Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire 
in 1876, following the rebellion by Herzegovinian and Bosnian peasants (most of 
whom were Orthodox Serbs). Serbia’s declaration of war referred to the ‘mission of 
Kosovo’, while Prince Nikola believed the time to ‘avenge Kosovo’ had arrived. 
‘Under Murad I the Serbian empire was destroyed – now during the reign of Murad V 
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it has to rise again!’ the Montenegrin ruler declared.49 When Serbia became a 
kingdom in 1882, Milan Obrenović was hailed as ‘the first Serbian king since 
Kosovo’, although, like other similar references to the past, this one was based on a 
historical untruth.50  
Nevertheless, it was only at the time of the 500th anniversary of the battle that 
St Vitus’ Day truly became the national holiday.51 In 1889 the Serbian Royal 
Academy, the Court, and the Church all commemorated the 500th anniversary of the 
battle. The Academy’s president Čedomilj Mijatović, gave a special lecture in the 
Academy on 11 June. He argued that the memory of Kosovo was the main component 
of Serbian nationhood, even above language and religion. ‘An inexhaustible source of 
national pride was discovered at Kosovo. More important than language and stronger 
than the Church this pride unites all Serbs in a single nation’, Mijatović told his 
audience, before summarising both the significance of the Kosovo myth for the Serbs 
and the way they perceive(d) their history: 
There was never a [Serbian] war for freedom – and when was there no war? – 
in which the spirit of the Kosovo heroes did not participate. The new history52 
of Serbia begins with Kosovo – a history of valiant efforts, long suffering, 
endless wars, and unquenchable glory…We bless Kosovo because the 
memory of the Kosovo heroes upheld us, encouraged us, taught us, and guided 
us.’53 
 
Mijatović may have really believed in the ‘spirit of the Kosovo heroes’, given his 
participation in spiritualist séances in Victorian England, where he lived first as 
Serbian minister to London and where he remained following his resignation in 
1903,54 but he was not alone. Serbian troops marching into Kosovo during the First 
Balkan War of 1912 appeared to believe not only that they were avenging the defeat 
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of 1389, but that they were joined by the Kosovo heroes. Instances of collective 
hallucination were reported, some Serbian soldiers apparently convinced they saw 
silhouettes of medieval knights marching alongside them.55 As one of the soldiers 
wrote in his diary in October 1912, just as his unit was about to enter Kosovo: 
The single sound of that word – Kosovo – caused an indescribable excitement. 
This one word pointed to the black past – five centuries. In it exists the whole 
of our sad past – the tragedy of Prince Lazar and the entire Serbian people… 
 Each of us created for himself a picture of Kosovo while we were still 
in cradle. Our mothers lulled us to sleep with the songs of Kosovo, and in our 
schools our teachers never ceased in their stories of Lazar and Miloš… 
 When we arrived on Kosovo and the battalions were placed in order, 
our commander spoke: ‘Brothers, my children, my sons!’ His voice breaks. 
‘This place on which we stand is the graveyard of our glory. We bow to the 
shadows of fallen ancestors and pray God for the salvation of their souls.’ His 
voice gives out and tears flow in streams down his cheeks and grey beard and 
fall to the ground. He actually shakes from some kind of inner pain and 
excitement. 
The spirits of Lazar, Miloš, and all the Kosovo martyrs gaze on us. We 
feel strong and proud, for we are generation which will realize the centuries-
old dream of the whole nation: that we with the sword will regain the freedom 
that was lost with the sword.56  
 
Indeed the whole campaign was in many respects perceived by Serbs as a holy war. 
Veterans of the Kosovo campaign were awarded with specially coined medals 
inscribed with ‘To the Avengers of Kosovo, 1912-1913’. The author of the design of 
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the medal was Ivan Meštrović, a pro-Yugoslav Croatian sculptor who was inspired by 
the Kosovo mythology (see below). 
During the First World War, in late 1915, before the Serbian army’s epic 
retreat towards the Greek island of Corfu through the mountains of northern Albania, 
Marshal Živojin Mišić suggested that the Serbian army make a last stand against the 
overwhelming Austro-German-Bulgarian enemy at Kosovo. The suggestion 
essentially to repeat Lazar’s heroic but ultimately suicidal choice of heavenly Serbia 
was rejected by other Serbian leaders.57 The significance of the Kosovo myth among 
Serbian soldiers fighting in the First World War was also recorded by the American 
journalist John Reed in his classic account The War in Eastern Europe.58 
Were the high emotions attached to Kosovo the reason why Serbs failed to 
notice that although most medieval monasteries and churches remained, there were 
not many Serbs left in Kosovo by the early twentieth century? According to the 
population census of 1921, the first to be carried out in the new Yugoslav state, there 
were some 439,000 people on the territory of what would become Kosovo and 
Metohija after the Second World War, only around 21 per cent of whom were Serbs.59 
The majority of the rest were ethnic Albanians. 
The Kosovo myth, however, should not be exclusively linked with nationalist 
rhetoric of the nineteenth century. Serbian Liberals in the 1860s and the Radicals in 
the 1880s used the Kosovo theme to champion freedom and democracy, while the 
ruling Conservatives and the Court used it to compare the opposition with the 
treacherous Vuk Branković.60 On the eve of the 500th anniversary of the battle, 
Serbian archimandrite and historian Ilarion Ruvarac published a critical study on 
Prince Lazar, which led to a fierce polemic between the new generation of critical 
historians and the older, romantic one. Another historian, Ljubomir Kovačević, 
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showed, independently of Ruvarac, that there was no evidence that Vuk Branković 
had been a traitor.61 It may be argued that the debate about the fictional and historical 
in the myth of Kosovo led to the birth of Serbian critical historiography. Ruvarac was 
regarded as the founder of the critical school of history by a whole generation of 
Serbian historians of the late nineteenth century, while at the same time he was 
fiercely criticised for his ‘unpatriotic history’ by national ideologists and by the 
church.62 
 
The Yugoslav Kosovo myth 
 
The powerful message that the Kosovo myth carried was recognised by advocates of 
Yugoslav unity, especially Croats (among whom the Yugoslav idea first emerged in 
the 1830s). Thus, the 500th anniversary of the Kosovo battle was commemorated in 
Croatia, despite restrictions imposed by the Habsburg authorities. Obzor, a leading 
Zagreb daily, had several issues seized by the authorities for publishing articles about 
Kosovo, but on 27 June 1889 it managed to publish the following lines: 
Whenever the Serbs rose up to lead whatever part of their people to freedom, 
they always appeared with the wreath of Kosovo around their heads to say in 
unison: This, o people, is what we are, what we want, and what we can do. 
And we Croatians – brothers by blood and by desire with the Serbs – today 
sing: Praise to the eternal Kosovo heroes who with their blood made certain 
that the desire for freedom and glory would never die. Glory to that people 
who gave them birth.63 
 
Because united Serb-Croat nationalism was seen as a threat to the Dual Monarchy in 
Budapest and Vienna, public manifestations marking the 500th anniversary were 
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banned by the ban (governor) of Croatia Kàroly Khuen-Héderváry. A play about the 
Battle of Kosovo staged in the Dalmatian town of Split was interrupted by the police, 
but a leading Croatian actor travelled to Belgrade to play Prince Lazar in another play 
on the theme.64 
The authorities could not prevent the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences 
in Zagreb from holding a symposium commemorating the anniversary. Two lectures – 
by Franjo Rački, the Academy’s president, and Toma Maretić – were held and later 
published in a special issue of the Academy’s journal. In his introductory remarks 
Rački explained that the commemoration of the Kosovo battle was in line with the 
Academy’s mission to study ‘all important developments from the past of the 
Croatian and Serbian people’.65 
The 500th anniversary of the battle attracted interest from pan-Slav groups, as 
well. A Czech pan-Slav organisation sent to Belgrade a wreath across which the 
following was written: ‘The Czech nation. 1389. +27/6 1889. From ashes to 
greatness.’, while a Russian newspaper wrote: ‘Not to praise the memory of Kosovo 
in Russia means treason to Slavic ethnic feeling.’ At the same time, the Russian 
embassy in Vienna commemorated the anniversary with the help from Serbian and 
Croatian cultural organisations.66 
The fascination with the Kosovo mythology survived the 500th anniversary 
celebrations. Ivan Meštrović, the famous Croatian sculptor and a leading proponent of 
Yugoslavism, was also inspired by it. He saw the 1389 battle as the symbol of South 
Slav suffering and struggle for freedom against the foreign oppression. His major, 
though never completed work, was entitled ‘The Vidovdan Temple’. It was a 
monument to the Kosovo myth and the South Slav epic tradition and represented 
Meštrović’s belief in the national unity of the South Slavs, combining Serbian 
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Orthodox with Croat and Slovene Catholic traditions, and bringing together Yugoslav 
‘eastern’ and ‘western’ civilisations.67 Fragments of this monumental work were 
exhibited at the World Exposition in Rome in 1911 at the Serbian pavilion, causing 
considerable controversy. Meštrović, a citizen of Austria-Hungary, refused to exhibit 
at the Habsburg pavilion, because a separate pavilion for the Empire’s South Slav 
artists was not provided.68  
During the interwar period, the Kosovo myth was used by champions of the 
Yugoslav ideology as a pan-Yugoslav myth. For example, the organ of a group of 
Yugoslav nationalists, supporters of King Aleksandar’s dictatorship, was called 
Vidovdan. The assassination of King Aleksandar in Marseilles in October 1934, 
organised and carried out by Macedonian and Croatian revolutionaries, prompted one 
of the leading ideologists of ‘integral’ Yugoslavism, a Croat Juraj Demetrović, to 
compare Aleksandar with Lazar. Demetrović argued that Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
all had their Kosovos and their Lazars, but that Aleksandar, who gave his life for 
Yugoslavia, was the first Yugoslav martyr, the ‘Yugoslav Lazar’.69 In fact, not unlike 
Lazar, Aleksandar became posthumously known as the King-Martyr. Such a close 
connection between Yugoslavism and the main Serbian national myth did little to 
change the perception that interwar Yugoslavia was a Serb-dominated state. Nor did it 
help that a Serb-preferred centralist constitution, opposed by many Croats, was 
promulgated on 28 June 1921 and was known as the Vidovdan Constitution.70  
 
 
The Western Kosovo myth 
 
During the First World War, at the time when Serbia was a ‘plucky little ally’ of the 
West, the Kosovo myth proved useful to pro-Serbian western propaganda. Thus, in 
France in 1915 schools were instructed by the government to offer lessons on Serbia 
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and Serbian history, while in June 1916 Paris was covered with posters to mark ‘La 
Journée Serb’. Similarly, posters which praised ‘brave Serbia’ and urged prayers for 
Serbia on ‘the Kossovo Day’ could be seen that same June in London and other 
British cities.71 The same year the Kossovo Day Committee was formed in London. It 
was chaired by Dr Elsie Inglis, and its members included R.W. Seton-Watson. Seton-
Watson was a leading British expert on East-Central Europe alongside Arthur Evans 
of the London Times, who worked closely with the Committee, as did the Oxford-
based historian Charles Oman and his Cambridge counterpart R.G.D. Laffan. Seton-
Watson’s essay ‘Serbia: Yesterday, To-day, To-morrow’ was read aloud in schools 
across the country.72 
‘The Kossovo Day’ in fact turned into a ‘Kosovo week’. On 2 July 1916, 
which was made the ‘Serbian Sunday’, Anglican priests prayed for Serbia and its 
dynasty; the Serbian priest Fr Nikolaj Velimirović officiated at a service in an 
Anglican church in London’s Soho – the first time a Serbian Orthodox priest had done 
so in an Anglican church. Five days later Fr Velimirović and the Archbishop of 
Canterbury held a joint service in London’s St Paul’s cathedral. The event was 
advertised with posters all over London, with the heading: ‘Think of Serbia, Pray for 
Serbia, Restore Serbia’.73 
Eminent historians such as Laffan and Oman contributed to the pro-Serbian 
discourse in Britain that used the Kosovo myth to emphasise Serbia’s centuries-long 
heroic struggle against not only the Ottomans but also Germans and Hungarians – all 
of course Britain’s enemies at the time. The title of Laffan’s 1918 book on Serbian 
history – The Serbs: The Guardians of the Gate (Oxford: Clarendon Press) – shows 
that others too saw Serbs as the defenders of Christianity in Europe. ‘The title, “the 
Guardians of the Gate”, is borrowed from a phrase applied to the Serbs by several 
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speakers, in particular by Mr. Lloyd George’, Laffan wrote in the book’s preface. ‘It 
is a summary of the services which the Serbs have always done their best to render to 
Christendom: for their country is, indeed, one of the gateways of civilized Europe.’ In 
an essay on the 1389 battle published in 1917, Oman blamed Hungary’s alleged 
failure to support Serbia in 1389 for the defeat of Lazar’s army. With the Hungarian 
King Sigismund of Luxemburg playing the role of Vuk Branković, Oman wrote: 
In 1389 he [Sigismund] was at peace with Lazarus, but he was not at his side 
in arms against the Turk, as any Hungarian King who saw the danger of the 
coming storm should have been. On hearing of the unhappy day of Kossovo 
his first act was to make his private profit out of disaster of Christendom. His 
armies at once crossed the Danube and seized Belgrade and the surrounding 
district along the Danube […] It was a true instance of Nemesis that for three 
hundred years Hungary was to pay for her treachery to Christendom in the 
fourteenth century: first by facing a hundred and thirty years of Turkish 
invasions, then by enduring a Turkish conquest, after Mohacs (1526) – the 
Hungarian equivalent for Kossovo – and finally by seeing Buda the seat of a 
Turkish pasha for a hundred and seventy years more.’74  
 
Pro-Serbian events were also organised in the United States in June 1918, with New 
York the centre of the commemoration. In the city’s church of St John the Divine a 
special service to mark ‘the Kossovo Day’ was officiated by Rev. Robbins, who 
compared the Serbs to the Israelites.75 The main commemoration took place on 17 
June in the Waldorf-Astoria, where James Beck, a former Assistant Attorney General 
of the US, stated in a keynote speech: 
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It is true that we commemorate defeat, but military defeats are often moral 
victories. If Serbia is now temporarily defeated, she has triumphed at the great 
bar of the public opinion and she stands in the eye of the nations as justified in 
the quarrel. Serbia was not only the innocent, precipitating cause in this world 
war, but it is the greatest martyr, and I am inclined to think, in many respects 
its greatest hero.76 
 
Reminding his audience of Lazar’s choice Beck argued: ‘The war is a great expiation 
for the failure of civilized nations for centuries to recognize the duty that…Lazar 





Eighty years after Beck uttered those words, another western politician gave a speech 
on the anniversary of the battle, albeit under different circumstances and with a 
different message. Robin Cook, the late British Foreign Minister and an enthusiastic 
advocate of a military intervention against Serbia, chose 28 June 1999 to address ‘the 
Serb people’. Cook pointed out that ten years previously Slobodan Milošević used the 
anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo ‘not to give a message of hope and reform’, but 
instead ‘threatened force to deal with Yugoslavia’s internal political difficulties’, thus 
launching ‘his personal agenda of power and ethnic hatred under the cloak of 
nationalism.’ Cook then called on the Serbs to break with the Milošević era and face 
their recent past: ‘When he [Milošević] goes, the Serb people will once again have 
their chance to take their rightful place in modern Europe…This will involve facing 
up to the truth of what Milosevic and his regime have done across former 
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Yugoslavia.’78 More remarkable than the content of the speech is the date on which 
Cook chose to deliver it. While calling on the Serbs to make a break with their recent 
past, during which their leaders exploited the anniversary of the battle and the myth of 
Kosovo, the former Foreign Secretary had also, in his own way, (mis)used St Vitus’ 
Day. The war between NATO and Serbia ended on 11 June 1999 and there was no 
obvious reason why the speech could not have been delivered on another date. Cook, 
of course, was not the only public figure to exploit the symbolic importance of 28 
June among Serbs, as this article has shown. 
Milošević was at last overthrown on 5 October 2001, by his own people, in a 
remarkably bloodless revolution. As the historian Stevan Pavlowitch noted, on 5 
October the Orthodox church celebrates the Holy Prophet Jonah, ‘the one who had 
been swallowed by a big fish, and who spent three days and three nights in its belly.’79 
The Serbs finally had a chance – which at the time of the writing of this article does 
not appear to have been seized fully – to ‘release’ St Vitus. In Pavlowitch’s words:  
Saint Guy – he of Vidovdan, 15/28 June, and known as Vitus in Latin, Guido 
in Italian, Vid in Slavonic languages – was a third-century martyr from 
southern Italy. He is invoked as the patron of those who suffer from epilepsy 
and nervous disorders, and from the bites of mad dogs and snakes. Through no 
fault of his own, he has been burdened for too long with the fate of Serbia. 
Few Serbs even knew that he could help with nervous disorders and the bites 
of mad dogs. And they had forgotten that they had once believed he could help 
them see better. It is time to release him from his bondage. The Prophet Jonah 
can take over. On his day Serbia emerged from the years spent in the belly of 
the Milošević regime. It is free to face its problems in stark daylight.80 
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However, St Vitus continues to be haunted by – or to haunt? – Serbian history. As 
mentioned at the beginning of the article, Milošević was extradited to The Hague 
Tribunal on 28 June 2001. Did the Serbian government of the late prime minister 
Zoran Djindjić thus wish to break symbolically with the past? (Djindjić himself was 
assassinated in March 2003 for attempting to make a clear break with the Milošević 
years). It is tempting to suggest the date of the extradition was not a coincidence and 
that Milošević was not extradited on Vidovdan (only) because an aid donors’ 
conference was taking place the following day.81 Although Djindjić and his circle 
claimed the choice of date was coincidental,82  the Prime Minister’s address to the 
nation of 28 June 2001 is worth citing because it shows, if nothing else, that he was 
aware of the continued significance of the myth among the Serbs:  
 
Respected citizens of Serbia, 
Exactly twelve years ago, on St Vitus’ Day, one of the most important Serbian 
national holidays, Slobodan Milošević issued a call to our people to follow the 
ideals of what he described as heavenly Serbia. That led to twelve years of 
wars, catastrophe and devastation of our country. The government of Serbia 
has today taken upon itself to follow the ideals of the earthly Serbia, not so 
much for our own sake, but for the sake of our children. By making this 
decision we are securing the future of our children. I ask you to understand 
this difficult, but the only right decision.83  
 
Do developments surrounding Kosovo in recent years mean that the Kosovo metaphor 
has finally come true? As Bakić-Hayden pondered: ‘will [the Serbs] have to accept 
literally (i.e. in historical reality) the symbolic meaning of their epic poems, which 
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they carried down through the centuries, that in order for them to be spiritually 
redeemed they have to lose Kosovo physically?’84 Only time will tell. Kosovo, backed 
by the US and UK, declared independence from Serbia in February 2008, but 
Belgrade, supported by Russia among other countries, refuses to recognize it. At the 
time of the writing this article, no compromise solution is in sight, and new chapters 
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